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THE LEGISLATIVE STATUS OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE

Earl T. Crawford*
NCE a statute has been found to violate some constitutional
provision, a legislature is faced with a difficult problem of how to
change the statute so as to effect the. desired policy and still n,ot
violate constitutional principles. The general nature of this problem
is suggested by such inquiries as these: Will the subsequent overruling
of a previous judicial decision declaring a statute unconstitutional require any legislative action to put the statute into effect? Can a statute,
which has been held violative of the constitution, be amended by corrective or curative legislatio:p. without complete re-enactment if the statute as amended is to become operative? Can a constitutional amendment be used to revive an unconstitutional law without further legislative action? Does the nature of the constitutional defect make any
difference so far as the need for complete re-enactment is concerned?
Is the nature of the amending process of any real significance?
It is the purpose of this discussion to ·answer, if possible, these and
other related questions. No attempt will be made to treat the various
problems which involve the effect of the statute on persons or property,
either before or after the removal of the constitutional vice, unless incidentally insofar as legislation is required to place the act in operation.
The basic or underlying nature of the unconstitutional statute· from
the standpoint of the necessity for legislative action to give it effect as
law will be the general theme of this study.

O

General Nature of An Unconstitutional Statute
The nature of further legislative action required when a statute
has been called unconstitutional is dependent for the most part upon
the theory used by the court in holding the statute unconstitutional. As
one might expect, there is considerable ·confusion and conBict in such
theories.
"' Member, Missouri bar; visiting professor of law, University of Kansas (1949-50).-Ed.
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Some cases dogmatically declare that "an unconstitutional act is not
a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;
it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though
it had never been passed."1 Others, using words of a similar import, state
that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio,2 that it is simply a statute in form3 and has no more force or validity as a law than a piece
of blank paper4 and must be regarded as never having been enacted.11
Still others maintain that the statute which has been declared to be in
violation of the constitution is, in effect at least, expunged from the
statute law of the state. 6
Such pronouncements and their frequent reiteration throughout the
years by many courts would lead one to believe that they express a universally accepted rule of law.· A study of the decisions, however, will
readily disclose that some courts refuse to accept such broad statements
without quali6.cation,7 while others seem to reject them completely and
unhesitatingly declare that an unconstitutional statute is nevertheless a
statute, a legislative act, which the supreme court cannot set aside,8 and
that the adjudication of unconstitutionality does not wipe the act from
the statute book9 or repeal1° or annul it. 11 Such decisions seem to recog1 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 at 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121 (1886). Also see
People v. Schraeberg, 347 ill. 392, 179 N.E. 829 (1932); State v. One Oldsmobile
Sedan, 227 Minn. 280, 35 N.W. (2d) 525 (1948); State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 342
Mo. 641, 117 S.W. (2d) 319 (1938); Ceptral National Bank v. Sutherland, 113 Neb.
126, 202 N.W. 428 (1925).
2 Lieber v. Neil, (Mo. App. 1930) 32 S.W. (2d) 792. See also Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803); State ex rel. Stephenson v. TuHy, 20 Nev. 427, 22 P.
1054 (1890).
3 Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N.W. 454 (1903).
4 Seneca Mining Co. v. Ozmun, 82 Mich. 573, 47 N.W. 25 (1890); Ex parte Bockhorn, 62 Tex. Cr. 651, 138 S.W. 706 (1911).
r; Crane Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 63 Ariz. 426, 163 P. (2d) 656 (1945);
Finders v. Bodle, 58 Neb. 57, 78 N.W. 480 (1899); State ex rel. Stephenson v. TuHy, 20
Nev. 427, 22 P. 1054 (1890). And is void from the date of its enactment. State ex rel.
Miller v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 S.W. (2d) 319 (1938).
o Boylan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 240 ill. 413, 88 N.E. 981 (1909).
7 Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317
(1940); Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 14 P. 27 (1887).
s "An unconstitutional act is not merely blank paper. The solemn act of the legislature is a fact to be reckoned with. Nowhere has power been vested to expunge it or remove
it from its proper place among-statutes." State v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596 at 601, 52 A. 362
(1902). See also Byrnes v. Boulevard Commissioners, 16 N.J. Misc. 141, 197 A. 667
(1938).
9 Shepherd v. Wh~ling, 30 W.Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635 (1887). Also see McCollum v.
McCognaughy, 141 Iowa 172, 119 N.W. 539 (1909) and Rutten v. Patterson, 73 N.J.L.
467, 64 A. 573 (1906) (involving stipulated facts).
10 Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86 (1874). Note also Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla.
513, 55 S. 273 (1911), and Dwyer v. Volmar Trucking Corp., 105 N.J.L. 518, 146 A.
685 (1929) (procedural statute).
11 Shepherd v. Wheeling, 30 W.Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635 (1887).
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nize that the statute has a sort of corporeal existence even if it has no
force as a law-an existence which can be terminated only by legislative
action.12
At least three reasons may be set forth why an adjudication of unconstitutionality does not obliterate a legislative enactment. Sometimes
the cause of the conflict with the constitution is regarded simply as a
barrier to the statute's operation as a valid law. 13 Upon removal of the
barrier, it is asserted, the statute will become fully effective.14 It should
be pointed out here, however, that perhaps not all defects constitute
removable barriers. Some courts, as will be seen later on, make a distinction between those defects which arise from a lack of constitutional
authority to enact the statute and those which spring from a defective
exercise of such authority. 15 Statutes falling within the first category
may be considered nonexistent by the same court which will uphold
enactments coming within the other class. Only defects due to the defective exercise of constitutional authority would operate to hold the
law in abeyance until removed.16
A second reason given for refusing to hold that an unconstitutional
statute is a mere piece of blank paper is that the adjudication against
the statute's constitutionality affects only the parties to the controversy
and constitutes no judgment against the statute so far as other parties
in future litigation are concemed,1 7 and only for the litigants in the
12 State ex rel. Aull v. Field, 119 Mo. 593, 24 S.W. 752 (1894); Byrnes v. Boulevard
Commissioners, 16 N.J. Misc. 141, 197 A. 667 (1938).
18 Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 55 S. 273 (1911); Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind.
86 (1874); Lawton Spinning Co. v. Commonwealth, 232 Mass. 28, 121 N.E. 518 (1919).
H Ibid. "That a statute which has been held unconstitutional either in tow or as
applied to a particular class of cases, is valid and enforceable after the supposed constitutional objection has been removed, is well settled. In re Raher, 140 U.S. 545, (11 Sup. Ct.
865, 35 L.Ed. 572); Blair 11. Ostrmuler, 109 Iowa, 204; Allison 11. Corker, 67 N.J. Law,
596 (52 Atl. 362.) •..•" McCollom v. McConaughy, 141 Iowa 172 at 177, 119 N.W. 539
(1909).
11> State ex rel. Charleston C.C. & C. R.R. v. Whitesides, 90 S.C. 579, 9 S.E. 661
(1889). Also note Walsh v. State ex rel. Soules, 142 Ind. 357, 41 N.E. 65 (1895); Ross
v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Iowa 427, 104 N.W. 506 (1905); State v. Silver Bow Relining Co., 78 Mont. 1, 252 P. 301 (1926).
16 There are, however, cases where the barrier to the state's statute's effectiveness was
a federal act, and the removal of the impediment by Congress [In re Raher, 140 U.S. 545,
11 S.Ct. 865 (1891); Blair v. Ostrander, 109 Iowa 204, 80 N.W. 330 (1899)) or by the
court [McCollum v. McConaughy, 141 Iowa 172, 119 N.W. 539 (1909)] put the statute
into immediate effect without re-enactment.
11 Shepherd v. Wheeling, 30 W.Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635 (1887). Also see McCollom v.
McConaughy, 141 Iowa 172, 119 N.W. 539 (1909). The rules that the court will refuse
to pass upon the unconstitutionality of an act on complaint of one who fails to show he is
injured by such an act [Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.
(2d) 115 (1946)), or who has availed himself of its benefits [Wall v. Parrot Silver &
Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 37 S.Ct. 609 (1917)) seem to support this view.

648

MmmcAN LAw REvmw

[Vol.. 49

case at bar does the court dete~ine the rights of the parties as if the
statute did not exist.18 The decision is a mere judicial precedent to
parties involved in future litigation.
A third reason, closely· akin or related to the one just stated, considers the decision against the act's constitutionality as also partaking
of the nature of a precedent and controlling only under the particular
facts involved, so that under a different set of facts, a different conclusion might be reached.19 But it.should be noted in this connection,
as a matter of precaution, that cases may be found in which the court,
while adjudicating the statute's unconstitutionality, obviously has decided more than the constitutional issue presented by the parties to the suit
and in reality has determined the issue of constitutionality in such a
manner that the decision would be binding should the issue afterwards
arise in other cases between entirely different parties even where a different although similar statute might be involved. 20 Such an extensive
decision, however, seems more in accord with the view that a statute
when actually declared unconstitutional ceases to exist than with the
general doctrine that an adjudication of unconstitutionality cannot destroy a legislative enactment.
The rule that a statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid
as to another21 suggests that the element of time may be an important
consideration when the problem of constitutionality arises. It is obvious,
if this element is to be regarded as a factor, that different conditionseconomic, social and perhaps political-may actually determine the
18 ''The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the statute, but the
decision affects the parties only, and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion
or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar
cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute-book; it does not repeal, 'supersede,
revoke, or annul' the statute. The parties to that suit are concluded by the judgment, but
no· one else is bound. A new litigant may bring a new suit, based upon the very same
statute, and the former decision can not be pleaded as an estoppel, but can be relied on
only as a precedent." Shepherd v. Wheeling, 30 W.Va. 479 at 483, 4 S.E. 635 (1887).
Also see In re Wellington, 16 Pick. (Mass:) 87 (1834). And note State ex rel. Atlantic
Horse Insurance Co. v. Blake, 241 Mo. 100 at 107, 144 S.W. 1094 (1912) that laws
"enacted by the Legislature are presumed to be valid, and even if defective because violative
of some provision of the State Constitution, are not void, although they may in a proper
case be voidable; that is, upon complaint by a party whose rights are impaired by such
statute."
10 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486
(1935); Ferrante v. Fish & Game Commission, 29 Cal. (2d) 365, 175 P. (2d) 222 (1946);
Bowe v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E. (2d) 115 (1946). Also see
St. Louis, hon Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 32 S.Ct. 493
(1912) and Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325, 34 S.Ct. 599 (1914).
20 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394 (1923); Ribnik v.
McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 48 S.Ct. 545 (1928); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,
320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E. (2d) 115 (1946).
21 See note 19 supra.
' ·
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issue of constitutionality,22 so that a statute constitutional when enacted
may become unconstitutional by reason of later events.23 And conversely, "if the march of events can make a constitutional law unconstitutional, a law which has once been declared invalid may similarly
ripen to constitutionality,"24 and may become fully effective without
further legislative attention. All of which further indicates that an unconstitutional statute is not necessarily void or nonexistent.
Although the unconstitutional statute is considered "null and void"
and "as never having been passed,".it will often have some efficacy as
a law prior to the judicial determination of fatal conflict.25 lt may after
enactment stand unchallenged for years. Frequently, nothing will appear upon the face of the act to show that it is invalid. As a result, it
will be obeyed and even enforced as if it were a valid law,26 and rights
will come into being or be limited or completely destroyed by it.27 It is
22Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458 (1921) and Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 44 S.Ct. 405 (1924) (District of Columbia emergency rent law);
Shallenberger v. First National Bank, 219 U.S. 114,. 31 S.Ct. 189 (1911) and Abie State
Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 51 S.Ct. 252 (1931) (bank guaranty law).
2s State v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 147 Neb. 970, 25 N.W. (2d) 824
(1947). "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to
which it is applied." Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405
• at 415, 55 S.Ct. 486 (1935).
24 Note, 40 YALE L.J. 1101 at 1102 (1931).
25 State ex rel. Aull v. Field, 119 Mo. 593, 24 S.W. 752 (1894). See also Phipps v.
School District of Pittsburgh, (3d Cir. 1940) Ill F. (2d) 393; Allison v. Corker, 67
N.J.L. 596, 52 A. 362 (1902); State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N.E. 999 (1896).
Note Byrnes v. Boulevard Commissioners of Hudson County, 16 N.J. Misc. 141 at 149,
197 A. 667 (1938): "Comparatively few of the laws enacted are subjected to a constitutional test in a court proceeding. Much time passes, as a rule, between the enactment of
a law and a judicial determination of its constitutionality. Where the law affects govern·
mental functions, public necessity very often requires a continuance of those functions."
For suggestion that the court did not "give color, or countenance, to the idea that an act
of the legislature which is unconstitutional at its inception, is .rendered valid by having
remained on the statute book, unassailed, for more than half a century," see Ex parte
Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 228 at 239, 4 S.W. 91 (1886).
26 State v. Carroll, 36 Conn. 449 at 472 (1871): ''Every law of the legislature,
however repugnant to the constitution, has not only the appearance and semblance of
authority, but the force of law. It cannot be questioned at the bar of private judgment, and
if thought unconstitutional resisted, but must be received and obeyed, as to all intents and
purposes [as] law, until questioned in and set. aside by the courts." Also see Preveslin v.
Derby & A. Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 518 (1930). But note Hyman v. Long
Branch Kennel Club; 115 N.J.L. 123, 179 A. 105 (1935).
27 Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462 at 469, 14 P. 27 (1887): "Again, it is not a universal
rule, as claimed by appellant, that an unconstitutional law is void ab initio, and absolutely
wanting in all binding force, and a nullity. There is at least one exception, viz.: that an
act duly passed or approved has the force of law to protect citizens dealing with public
officers under its provisions up to the time it is declared unconstitutional. • • • It has been
held that an act creating an office, though unconstitutional, is sufficient to give color of title,
and that an officer acting under it is an officer de facto." See also Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter Springs Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317 (1940).
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subject to legislative repeal. 28 It has a potential if not an actual existence
as a law. It is only when some person attempts to resist its operation
and resorts to the courts to have it pronounced void as to him, his property, or his rights, that the objection of unconstitutionality can be presented and sustained. 29 And if sustained, the prior influence of the
statute is not thereby wholly obliterated. It has had an operative effect
which cannot be erased by a judicial decision, 30 and it would seem manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.31
In addition to the foregoing views relative to the nature of the
unconstitutional statute, there are others, perhaps not always applicable,
which do further indicate the inaptness of the statement that an unconstitutional statute is in effect expunged from the statute books by the
judicial declaration of constitutional conllict. While it is impossible
within the limited scope of this discussion to discuss or even to enumerate these additional indicia that an unconstitutional statute is not
destroyed by a decision adverse to its constitutionality, two are perhaps
of sufficient significance to deserve specific mention. First, the decision
against the constitutionality of the statute may be due to the application of the statute rather than to any constitutional defect. 32 For instance, those who seek to enforce the statute may endeavor to give it a .
wider scope than its provisions permit and thereby cause constitutional
conllict. Obviously, a decision of this character does not affect the existence of the statute. Second, a few decisions assert that the power exer28 "Certainly, the legislature may purge the statute books of any matter not lawfully
there. To deny it this power is to ascribe to it a most dishonoring impotence and a disregard
of the analogies of the law•.•• So when an act of the legislature is void for failure to
observe some constitutional prerequisite, nothing could be more appropriate than for the
legislature to remove the act at once from a place among the valid laws of the state and
at the same time enact a valid law on the same subject in its stead. It is not an attempt
to resuscitate the void act, nor to build upon it as a foundation. It is a simple declaration
that in the future it is not to be regarded." State ex rel. Aull v. Field, 119 Mo. 593 at
604-605, 24 s.w. 752 (1894).
29 In re Wellington, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 87 (1834). Also see Bowe v. Commonwealth,
320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E. (2d) 115 (1946); State ex rel. Atlantic Horse Insurance Co. v.
Blake, 241 Mo. 100, 144 S.W. 1094 (1912) and Shepherd v. Wheeling, 30 W.Va. 479,
4 S.E. 635 (1887).
30Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317
(1940). Also see Warring v. Colpoys, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 642 at 646: "When
a statute is declared unconstitutional, it falls because it must yield to the basic, superior
law. There is much more reason to argue that the unconstitutional statute never was the
law. Yet today even such a statute is an operating fact and decisions made under its color
have the blessing of res judicata."
31Note, 25 VA. L. REv. 210 (1939).
32 Borchert v. City of Ranger, (D.C. Tex. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 577. Also see note, 27
CoRN. L.Q. 395 (1941).
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cised by the court in declaring a legislative enactment unconstitutional
is often mistakenly considered different from the exercise of ordinary
judicial power. These courts argue that actually the adjudication of a
statute's unconstitutionality is simply the exercise of judicial power, and
courts should observe constitutional limitations by leaving to the legislature the function of repealing statutory enactments.33
Prior Decision of Unconstitutionality Overruled

It can probably be stated as a general rule, applicable even in those
jurisdictions which regard an unconstitutional statute as void, that reenactment is not necessary to make the statute effective as a law again
where the decision declaring it unconstitutional has been subsequently
overruled.34 Decisions may be found to the effect that the law is not
changed when a court overrules a previous decision, "and that the law is,
and really always was, as it is expounded in the later decision,"35 and
judicial decisions "are mere evidence of the law, not the law itself;
and an overruling decision is not a change of law but a mere correction of an erroneous interpretation."36 This doctrine indicates that an
erroneous adjudication of unconstitutionality does not affect the existence of the statute involved37 although it may for all practical purposes
and for the time being, that is, until the "supposed" unconstitutionality
is found not to exist, bar its effectiveness as a law. The statute is not dead
but merely dormant. The overruling decision removes the bar and the
statute becomes promptly effective without legislative re-enactment,
although again this does not mean that the later decision wipes out all
the effect of the erroneous one.38 And some courts say that the statute
33 Byrnes v. Boulevard Commissioners of Hudson County, 16 N.J. Misc. 141, 197
A. 667 (1938). Also see State v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 A. 362 (1902); Shepherd v.
Wheeling, 30 W.Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635 (1887).
34 Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 55 S. 273 (1911); Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind.
86 (1874); Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 14 P. 27 (1887). For treatment of the prospective operation of decisions holding statutes unconstitutional or overruling prior decisions, see
note, 60 HARv. L. Rnv. 437 (1947).
35 Ray v. West Pennsylvania Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 576 at 590, 20 A. 1065
(1891); Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W.Va. 172 at 175, 41 S.E. 193 (1902).
36Legg's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (4th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d)
760 at 764.
37Warring v. Colpoys, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 642.
ss See Snyder, "Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions," 35 ILL. L. R:nv. 121
(1940); Freeman, "The Protection Afforded against the Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision," 18 CoL. L. R:nv. 230 (1918); 42 YALB L.J. 779 (1933). That a change
of decision by the highest court of the state does not impair the obligations of contracts
entered into in reliance on the former decision within meaning of the Federal Constitution,
see Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N.E. 280 (1921).
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becomes valid not just from the date of the overruling decision but from
the hour of the statute's enactment.39

Removal of Unconstitutionality by Constitutional Amendment
-

The constitutional barrier which forms the basis for an adjudication
of unconstitutionality, of course, so far as future legislation is concerned,
may be removed by the adoption of an amendment to the constitution.
What, however, is the legislative status of a prior constitutionally defective act after the adoption of the constitutional amendment? An examination of the few cases relative to this particular inquiry will reveal
some uncertainty. In a general way, it would appear that two conflicting
views exist relative to the need for legislative action after the constitutional barrier has been removed. One indicates that the mere adoption of
the constitutional amendment will not of itself validate the unconstitutional law. 40 The other declares that the amendment removing the constitutional barrier or prohibition will place the statute into immediate
operation without re-enactment.41
· The conclusion that the adoption of an amendment to the constitution will not of itself validate the prior constitutionally prohibited
act inescapably follows, so it would seem, if we accept as a basic premise
the proposition that an unconstitutional statute is void from the date
of its passage.42 Actually, according to the logical implications of this
S9 State ex rel. Patterson v. Lee, 121 Fla. 541, 164 S. 188 (1935). See also references
in note 38 supra.
.
·
40 For example, where a statute purported to give the governor the power to remove
certain public officers for misconduct by vesting judicial power in him in contravention of
the state constitution, the statute was not validated by an amendment subsequently adopted
expressly giving him the power of removal. Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19 N.W.
112 (1884). Likewise a statute which directed the state treasurer to invest a certain part
of the school funds 'in bonds of other states and which had been enacted under the erroneous belief that an amendment to the constitution authorizing such statute had been legally
adopted, was not validated by the subsequent· adoption of a new corrective constitutional
amendment. State ex rel. Stevenson v. Tufly, 20 Nev. 427, 22 P. 1054 (1890). And
where a sheriff in·.his answer to defendant's petition for a ~t of habeas corpus attempted
to justify the latter's incarceration by contending that the constitution had been subsequently
amended to give the court the power to impose the sentence previously imposed by it in
contravention of .the constitution and that the effect thereof was to vitalize the statute which
before had been inoperative, the court held that the petitioner was being unlawfully deprived of.his liberty notwithstanding the amendment. Whetstone v. Slonaker, 110 Neb.
343, 193 N.W. 749 (1923). Also see State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117
S.W. (2d) 319 (1938); Central National Bank v. Sutherland, 113 Neb. 126, 202 N.W.
428 (1925); Roberts Realty Co. v. City of Orange, 103 N.J.L. 711, 139 A. 54 (1927);
Smith v. Cameron, 123 Ore. 501, ~62 P. 946 (1928).
41 Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71- S.E. 479 (1911); State ex rel. Marr v. Luther,
56 Minn. 156, 57 N.W. 464 (1894); People ex rel. McClelland v. Roberts, 148 N.Y. 360,
42 N.E. 1082 (1896); Hutchinson v. Patching, 103 Tex. 497, 126 S.W. 1107 (1910).
42 ''The act being void, no subsequent adoption of an amendment to the constitution,
authorizing the legislature to provide for such investment, would have the effect to infuse
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view, there is no statute in being. to be revived. Nevertheless, some
cases, in spite of the asserted nonexistence of the unconstitutional
statute as an entity, hold that the removal of the constitutional barrier
will place the previously prohibited act into operation as a valid law.
To so conclude, however, with any degree of logic where the unconstitutional statute is considered void requires that the constitutional
amendment do more than merely grant prospective authority for legislative enactment of such a statute.48 The amendment, for example,
must be legislative in nature and in some manner include the previously
invalid law within its scope if it is to affect the statute previously adjudged unconstitutional. This seems evident from the cases which
hold that no additional legislative action is required, for the constitutional amendment will be found so worded that it will by virtue of its
own language embody the prior unconstitutional act and also be selfexecuting,44 or else it will specifically ratify, validate or confirm the prior
unconstitutional statute45 or be at least curative or confirmatory in
nature,4 6 so that the statute is actually, or in effect, made a part of the
constitutional amendment. 47
life into a thing that never had any ~fence." State ex rel. Stevenson v. Tufly, 20 Nev.
427 at 428-9, 22 P. 1054 (1890). Also see In re Graves, 325 Mo. 888, 30 S.W. (2d)
149 (1930) and Whetstone v. Slonaker, 110 Neb. 343, 193 N.W. 479 (1923).
48 Banaz v. Smith, 113 Cal. 102, 65 P. 309 (1901). See also Seneca Mining Co. v.
Ozmun, 82 Mich. 573, 47 N.W. 25 (1890).
.
44 People ex rel. McClelland v. Roberts, 148 +'}.Y. 360, 42 N.E. 1082 (1896), and
note especially the dissenting opinion in which appear these words (at 371): "I am aware
of no principle on which it can be held that this statute became valid by the subsequent
constitutional amendment, unless the amendment was self-executing."
· 45 Fontenot v. Young, 128 La. 20, 54 S. 408 (1911); State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley,
342 Mo. 641, 117 S.W. (2d) 319 (1938); Hutchinson v. Patching, 103 Tex. 497, 126
s.w. 1107 (1910).
46 Fontenot v. Young, 128 La. 20, 54 S. 408 (191 l); State ex rel. Marr v. Luther, 56
Minn. 156, 57 N.W. 464 (1894); Hutchinson v. Patching, 103 Tex. 497, 126 S.W. 1107
(1910). Also see Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523 (1871), and Banaz v. Smith, 113 Cal. 102,
65 P. 309 (1901).
· 47 "In the instant case the ratification and confirmation of Act No. 15 of· 1910 can
mean nothing else than that its infirmities, if any existed, are cured, and that it is to be
regarded as having been constitutional from the beginning; and we do not find any contract
is thereby impaired or vested right devested." Fontenot v. Young, 128 La. 20 at 29, 54 S.
408 (1911). Also see State ex rel. Marr v. Luther, 56 Minn. 156, 57 N.W. 464 (1894)
that an invalid act was, by necessary implication, validated by a constitutional amendment,
which, having been adopted with reference to existing legislation, recognized its validity by
prescribing the manner of its repeal. And note Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313 at 334,
71 S.E. 479 (1911), that the people, through the constitution, had the power originally,
and by an amendment duly made, could aµe the defect in the legislation, and all that
happened was that the legislature proposed and .the people ratified an amendment to the
constitution ''by which that was rendered constitutional which previously the legislature
could not constitutionally do." And, to the effect that an amendment of the constitution,
as the highest and most recent expression of the law-making power, operates to repeal those
inconsistent with it, see Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526, 121 S.W. (2d) 737 (1938).
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On the other hand, if the constitutional amendment does not embody the invalid statute in the manner just pointed out, it is difficult to
see how the ratification of a purely permissive constitutional amendment can give the prior invalid statute effect if its invalidity was due to
a lack of constitutional authority on the part of the legislature to enact
such a law in the 6.rst instance. Statutes obviouslv owe their existence
to legislative action. Without the authority to e~act a particular law,
how can it come into being? The subsequent grant of the constitutional
power to pass the particular statute previously prohibited would seem
incapable of giving a statute, enacted without authority, effect without
legislative re-enactment. If, however, the statute's unconstitutionality
is due to a defective exercise of granted authority, there is less objection to concluding that the amendment puts it into operation as a valid
law so far as the future is concerned. Now that the barrier of unconstitutionality has been removed there is nothing to prevent giving full
effect to the original statute.

Removal of Unconstitutionality by Statutory Amendment
Many statements will be found in the cases to the effect that life cannot be breathed into an unconstitutional statute by legislative amendment, that a valid law cannot be enacted by amending an invalid or void
statute,48 or that an unconstitutional act which never became a law by
reason of its constitutional infringement cannot be revived by amendment. 49 This is so, in the words of one court, because "of the abiding
character of the restraints imposed by the constitution upon legislative
action."50 Validity, according to another, cannot be imparted to an unconstitutional statute merely by legislative amendment for the obvious
reason that, after the objections which rendered it null and void are removed, "it might have an entirely different effect from what it had when
it was enacted."51
A few cases adopt a contrary attitude toward the power to amend.
They hold that an unconstitutional statute can be amended without
48 Cobbs v. Home Insurance Co., 18 Ala. App. 206, 91 S. 627 (1921); Crowley v.
Town of Rushville, 60 Ind. 327 (1878); Keane v. Remy, 201 Ind. 286, 168 N.E. 10
(1929).
49Teeple v. Wayne County, 23 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 361 at 362 (1900): " ••• the legislature has attempted to put life into this dead body by engrafting it with a new head. If
the main stock were alive and only the top were affected, this engrafting process might give
it new life. The transfusion of blood may save a dying patient but a dead one cannot be
resurrected by such process."
50Thomas v. State ex rel. Gilbert, 76 Ohio St. 341 at 359, 81 N.E. 437 (1907).
51 Atkinson v. Southern Express Co., 94 S.C. 444 at 452, 78 S.E. 516 (1913).
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complete re-enactment.52 An analysis of such cases, however, will disclose that sometimes an important distinction is made by the court
between the unconstitutionality which results from a total lack of
authority to enact the statute and that which is due to an irregular exercise of granted authority.53 It is reasoned that where the legislature has
solemnly declared its intention concerning what shall be the law upon
a subject clearly within the scope of granted constitutional authority,
and such declaration would have been a valid statute except for some
defect which could have been cured originally, the enactment may be
constitutionalized by amendment.54 Or stated in another way, if the
legislature had the power to pass the enactment intended originally, it
might, without re-enactment but merely by amendment, validate the
unconstitutional statute by removing the cause of conflict with the constitution.55
The conclusion that re-enactment is not required where the unconstitutionality results from an irregular exercise of the power to enact obviously is based on the premise that the original statute is really alive
although dormant, so that in reality there is something in existence on
which to engraft an amendment, but if the original act is considered
null and void from the date of its passage,56 it is admittedly difficult to
152 Los Angeles County v. Jones, 6 Cal. (2d) 695 at 708, 59 P. (2d) 489 (1936):
" ••• the better and more logical rule, is that announced in the following authorities to the
effect that an amendment to a statute which for any reason has been declared invalid
constitutes a valid enactment." Also see State v. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 419, 40 N.E. 508
(1898) that an unconstitutional statute can be amended, so far as future operation is
concerned, by striking out the evils or adding new provision to cause conformity to the
constitution.
158 "If the legislature possesses the power to authorize an act to be done, it could, by a
retrospective act, cure the evils which existed because the power thus conferred has been
irregularly e,xecuted." Thompso11, v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 327 at 331 (1866).
Also note Reeves v. Board of Education, 204 N.C. 74, 167 S.E. 454 (1933).
154 State v. Silver Bow Refining Co., 76 Mont. 1, 252 P. 301 (1926). Also note
Lewton Spinning Co. v. Commonwealth, 232 Mass. 28, 121 N.E. 518 (1919).
55 State ex rel. Charleston, C.C. & C. R. Co. v. Whitesides, 30 S.C. 579 at 586, 9
S.E. 661 (1889): "The pivotal point in a healing or validating statute is that it must be
confined to acts which the legislature could previously have authorized." Walsh v. State
ex rel. Soules, 142 Ind. 357 at 361, 41 N.E. 65 (1895): "But where the obnoxious features
of the statute may be removed, or essential ones supplied by proper amendment, so that it
can be h~d that had the law been primarily so moulded or framed under its title and
within its scope, as it has been by the amendment thereto, it would have been free of the
objections existing against it, as it originally stood, and also within the power of the Legislature to enact it, then, and in that event, the statute may be rendered valid by the amendment, so far as its future operation may extend." Also see Ross v. Board of Supervisors,
128 Iowa 427, 104 N.W. 506 (1905), and Paris Mountain Water Co. v. Greenville, 110
S.C. 36, 96 S.E. 545 (1917). An unconstitutional amendment however "is no amendment,
and the old law is left unaffected." State ex rel. Daily Record Co. v. Hartmann, 299 Mo.
410 at 422, 253 S.W. 991 (1925).
56 State ex rel. Steve~n v. TuHy, 20_Nev. 427, 22 P. 1054 (1890).
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deny that the adoption of an amendment seems to be an attempt to
amend something which never came into being. 57 The converse of the
above conclusion therefore seems to follow logically. If the statute has
been enacted without constitutional authorization-if the legislature
did not possess the power to pass a law upon the subject matter of the
enactment:5 8-the law-makers may not confirm, ratify, or render the
act valid by merely amending it.59
Frequently, only a part of the legislative act will conflict with the
constitution and that part is clearly separable from the remainder of the
act. Where this is the situation, there is ample authority for amending
the act and making it effective by removing the offending provision
without re-enactment of the law in its entirety. 60 If the various provisions are so interlocked and dependent that the striking down of one
so violative of the constitution will cause the entire statute to fall, mere
amendment, without complete re-enactment of the statute in its entirety, will fail to revive the original.61 In other words, so long as there
is "something of form and substance" left which is constitutional,
amendment is not only permissible but possible, and re-enactment of the
old act with the amendatory provisions incorporated therein is not
required. 62
Legislative enactments, particularly those of an elaborate nature,
will often contain a separability clause to the effect that the different
1>1 See Morris
1>8 Thompson

v. State, 40 Ariz. 32, 9 P. (2d) 404 (1932).
v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (75 U.S.) 327 (1866). Also see Paris Mountain Water Co. v. Greenville, llO S.C. 36, 96 S.E. 545 (1917) and Atkinson v. Southern
Express Co., 94 S.C. 444, 78 S.E. 518 (1913).
59Walsh v. State ex rel. Soules, 142 Ind. 357, 41 N.E. 65 (1895).
60Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo. 163 at 173, 24 S.W. 774 (1893): "There is a marked
difference in regard to the amendment of an act which is void in its entirety and one that
is only void in part, or when one section of an act is in conflict with the constitution of the
state and the remaining sections are in harmony therewith. Where the entire act is void
there is nothing to amend, while it is otherwise where there is only one section or part of a
section sought to be amended, as in the case at bar. In the latter case, the amendment
may be made to any part of the section, or by substituting an entirely new section in lieu
thereof, provided the act when amended does not embrace a purpose outside of its title,
and inconsistent ,vith the provisions remaining unrepealed." Note also Lawton Spinning
Co. v. Commonwealth, 232 Mass. 28, 121 N.E. 518 (1919); Clay v. Buchanan, 162
Tenn. 204, 36 S.W. (2d) 91 (1931).
61 Shear v. Potter County, 9 Pa. Dist. Rep. 289 (1899). Also note Keane v. Remy,
201 Ind. 286, 168 N.E. 10 (1929).
62 State v. Yard, 42 N.J.L. 357 (1880). See also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. State,
187 Okla. 164 at 167, 101 P. (2d) 793 (1940) quoting from State v. Silver Bow Refining
Co., 7,8 Mont. 1 at 14, 252 P. 301 (1926): " .•. the roots and the 'main stock' are still
alive and are grounded in fertile constitutional soil, and all that is necessary to cause the
tree to flourish is scientific pruning or grafting." And note McLaughlin v. Summitt Hill
Borough, 224 Pa. St. 425 at 429, 73 A. 975 (1909): " ... after the one clause (not the
section) was declared unconstitutional, there was something of form and substance left
which was constitutional. It was not 'a dead body.' It was something real and alive. It
was a living stem upon which a limb could be engrafted.''
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parts of the act are independent and the unconstitutionality of any part
shall not affect the validity of the remainder. The courts will usually
give effect to provisions of this type, 63 although the same result will
occur without the clause if enough remains of the statute, after discarding the invalid part, to show that the legislative intent was that
the rest should be effective notwithstanding partial invalidity. 64 And
even where such a provision is incorporated in the act, the law can be so
dependent in its several parts that the unconstitutionality of one part
will necessarily destroy the rest. 65 Any other view than this would give
to the separability clause the power to control the paramount legislative intent expressed or revealed by the statute as a whole. The result would be contrary to the basic rule that in the construction of a
statute the court must give effect to the legislative intent as ascertained
from each and every provision. So far as amendment without re-enactment is concerned, we may well conclude that, if any part of the statute
continues as a law after the adjudication of unconstitutionality, whether
continued by virtue of the separability clause or not, the act can be
amended and given effect, as amended, without complete re-enactment.
The presence of a provision in the constitution that no law shall be
revised, altered, or amended by reference to title alone, but the revised,
altered, or amended part shall be re-enacted and published at length, is
another important consideration. This provision will be found in most
constitutions. It was intended to abolish the legislative practice of
amending merely by the insertion, omission or substitution of words, or
by making some provision different, without setting forth the law intended to be amended, so that a person could not tell by reading just
the arnendatory act what the law was on the subject. 66 Its language
63 Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428, 43 S.Ct. 445 (1923); Alsup v. State,
178 Ark. 170, 10 S.W. (2d) 9 (1928); Swedish Hospital v. Department of Labor and
Industries, 26 Wash. (2d) 819, 176 P. (2d) 429 (1947).
G4 Note State ex rel. Randolph County v. Walden, 357 Mo. 167, 206 S.W. (2d) 979
(1947).
65 Sage v. Baldwin, (D.C. Tex. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 968; Hunter v. Conner, 152 Tenn.
258, 277 S.W. 71 (1925). Note also Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 49
S.Ct. 115 (1929); Riggins v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P. (2d) 645 (1935).
66 Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 lli. 305, 106 N.E. 276 (1914). See also Fletcher v.
Prather, 102 Cal. 413 at 418, 36 P. 658 (1894): "In the absence of a constitutional provision of this character, a section of an act might be, and often was, amended in one or
more of four ways: I. By striking out certain words; 2. By striking out certain words and
inserting others; 3. By inserting certain words; and 4. By adding other provisions. This
mode of amendment did not repeal or disturb the existence of the parts of the original
section not stricken out; but the objection to this mode of amendment was that it tended to
confusion and uncertainty, owing to the difficulty of correctly reading the original section
with the amendments-a difficulty which largely increased with each subsequent amendment. This uncertainty not only affected those who were called upon to interpret statutes
thus amended, but it begat uncertain and confused legislation, since every legislator, before
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would seem sufficient to require the re-enactment of the part retained.
Nevertheless, even in face of language so explicit, the general rule is
that, where an act is amended by adding new sections and altering old
ones, it will suffice to set forth the amended sections together with the
new sections without setting forth the whole of the act amended, and
it is only when all the sections of an act are amended that the entire act,
as amended, is required to be set forth. 67 Nor is re-enactment and publication at length considered necessary if the act is not an amendatory
one but completely independent in itself. 68 There are also cases which
hold that the unconstitutional statute though void, may be incorporated
into valid legislation by appropriate reference in an amendatory act,69
and that this reference may be simply to the title of the old law,70 provided, however, that the amendatory act is a complete statute in itself
with the reference included.71 Under such circumstances, the constitutional provision prohibiting revision, alteration, or amendment merely
by reference to title has been regarded as inapplicable72 because "it is
entirely within the legislative power to give effect to documents without
their full recital," and "the matter is purely one of identification,"73 or
because statutes known as "reference statutes"-those which refer to
and adopt pre-existing statutes-are not strictly amendatory.74
Since the old statute, that is, the part retained, is of necessity reenacted by an amendment passed pursuant to the constitutional provision prescribing that the amended portion shall be re-enacted and published at length, such re-enactment generally should be sufficient to give
life to a prior unconstitutional act; for if the old law, with the amendment, is re-enacted in accord with this provision of the constitution, it
may well be contended th-at the old law was not really amended but
that a new statute was passed by the legislature embodying the prohe could intelligently vote upon the proposed amendments, must fust know with certainty
how the section ~th all previous amendments read, and what ~t meant."
67 State v.
68 State v.

Chambers, 70 Mo. 625 (1879).
Bennett, 102 Mo. 356 at 364, 14 S.W. 865 (1890): " ••• we adhere to the
ruling that where the amended law is germane to the original one, and complete in itself,
so as to show at a glance the full scope and terms of the amendment, the fact that the
old sections are not republished or recited in the new law does not make it unconstitutional."
69 Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 151 S. 858 (1933). Accord: Allison
v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 A. 362 (1902); Commonwealth v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co., 118 Va. 261, 87 S.E. 662 (1916).
70 Morris v. State, 40 Ariz. 32, 9 P. (2d) 404 (1932).
11 Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 151 S. 858 (1933).
72 State ex rel. Baughn v. Ure, 91 Neb. 31, 135 N.W. 224 (1912). That this provision is inapplicable to unconstitutional laws, as they cannot be amended, see Cook v.
School District No. 80, 266 ill. 164, 107 N.E. 327 (1914).
73 Allison v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 A. 326 (1902).
74 Bloxton v. State Highway Commission, 225 Ky. 324, 8 S.W. (2d) 392 (1928).
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visions of the original act together with the chang~ wrought by the
amendment. The new enactment, for practical purposes and so far as
this study is concerned, would constitute an entirely new statute and
speak the legislative mandate from the date of its passage. It would
be only where the unconstitutionality of the amended statutes was due
to a lack of constitutional authority to enact that the amendment would
not constitutionalize the old law even though re-enacted and published
at length.
In connection with the removal of constitutional defects in legislative enactments, it is well to note that there are two general _theories
concerning the basic nature of the amending process. According to one,
sometimes referred to as the replacement theory, the original act is
blotted out and superceded by the amendatory act, 75 while under the
other, part of the original act continues in existence without interruption.76 Most courts follow the theory of continued existence which
means that the portion of an amended statute remaining the same as it
was prior to the amendment continues to be the law from the date of its
original enactment and any changes or additions are considered as having been enacted at the time of the amendment.77 Certainly it seems
logical to say that those parts of the prior statute which are retained and
into which the amendment is engrafted, date from the ho:ur of the act's
initial passage, at least in the absence of a constitutional provision prohibiting amendment without the re-enactment of the retained portion of
the old law or perhaps where such a provision, if existing, is considered
inapplicable. Under the replacement theory, on the other hand, since
an entirely ~ew statute comes into being,78 any defective exercise of
7lSGoodno v. City of Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127 at 130 (1872): "The original section, as
an independent and distinct statutory enactment, ceased to have any existence the very
moment the amendatory act was passed and went into effect." Also see State ex rel. Markham v. Elmquist, 201 Minn. 403, 276 N.W. 735 (1937).
76Jn re Childs Estate, 18 Cal. (2d) 237, 115 P. (2d) 432 (1941); Wade v. Farrell,
270 Mich. 562, 259 N.W. 326 (1935); State ex rel. Wahoo Waterworks v. City of Wahoo,
62 Neb. 40, 86 N.W. 923 (1901).
77Belfast v. Curry, 264 Mo. 483, 175 S.W. 201 (1915). Also see State ex rel.
Klein v. Hughes, 351 Mo. 651, 173 S.W. (2d) 877 (1943). "So far as the original provisions of the section remained unchanged, they were in force from the date of the original
enactment, and, so far as they were changed, the new or changed provisions took effect
from the date of the amendment •••" Fletcher v. Prather, 102 Cal. 413 at 418-419, 36 P.
658 (1894). This case, however, goes on to hold that"••. no reason for any change in the
operation of the amended statute is suggested in the provision of the constitution above
quoted, nor is any reason for a change apparent. We therefore conclude that its whole
purpose and effect is to avoid the evils resulting from the mode of amendment which might
and did prevail in the absence of such provision, and that it was not intended that the
section as amended should not take its place by its appropriate number in the original act."
78 Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co., 312 Pa. 183 at 194, 167 A. 793
(1933): ''In the case of an amendatory statute, it is a matter of indifference whether or
not the original statute was or was not unconstitutional. • . . This must be so, since every
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constitutional authority under the original statute is irrelevant and the
act as amended should be reconsidered as to constitutionality. If so, unless it is conceded that the effectiveness of the unconstitutional statute is
merely held in abeyance by the constitutional defect, perhaps it is not
unreasonable to conclude that amendment is not possible without reenactment of that portion of the old law which is to be retained. If the
unconstitutional statute is void, re-enactment of the retained portion
after the law-makers were granted the constitutional authority to enact
it would be necessary in order to give the statute validity.
Statutes are often repealed and instantaneously re-enacted in altered
form in the same bill. The result of this, of course, is, in effect, an
amendment of the prior law, and the repeal and re-enactment thus
effected have been considered to be an interruption of the effectiveness
of the former law. 79 This view is in harmony with the replacement
theory of the basic nature of the amending process, although here, too,
the generally accepted view is that the re-enactment is but a re-affirmance of the old law and not its re-enactment in a literal sense,80 so that
the capacity of this method of altering existing legislation to correct a
constitutionally defective statute also depends upon whether a completely new statute as an entity comes into being. Also, if a completely
new statute comes into being, the removal of a constitutional defect due
to a failure to exercise properly a constitutional power would seem possible by simultaneous repeal and re-enactment.

Defective Title
The title of a statute plays an important part in the legislative process if the constitution provides that no act shall contain more than one
subject or object which shall be expressed in the title. 81 Where such
a provision, or one similar, exists, the title must, of course, indicate the
purpose of the law, and anything which is incorporated in the body of
word of the amended statute, including that quoted from the original statute, is the language of the legislature which passed the amended act...• Before the amendment, the
section spoke the la:nguage of the legislature of 1901; the amended statute in its entirety
speaks the language of the legislature of 1903. Strike down the former and the latter

.

.

remains ••••

Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507 (1858).
v. Federal Liability Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 537, 193 N.W. 326 (1934);
State v. Ward, 328 Mo. 658, 40 S.W. (2d) 1074 (1931); State v. Massey, 103 N.C. 356,
9 S.E. 632 (1889). That an act repealing a pre-existing section and re-enacting the old
with a modification, constituted an amendment of the old and a continuation thereof as
amended, see State v. Bradford, 314 Mo. 684, 285 S.W. 496 (1926).
81 For a typical constitutional provision, see Kan. Const., art. II, §16, or Missouri
Const., art. III, §23.
79

80 McAdams
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the act but not indicated by the title will be excluded.82 Constitutional
provisions of the foregoing type are considered mandatory,83 and a
failure to meet the constitutional mandate will invalidate the enactment
in whole or in part depending upon the extent of the defect. 84 It is not
strange, therefore, that many statutes have constitutionally defective
titles, and the law-makers are frequently confronted with the problem
of effective amendment.
The contention that "an unconstitutional or void section of an act
cannot be amended by changing the title of the original act" has been
sustained as "sound doctrine and good law . . . upon principle and
authority."85 The reason for this conclusion, as stated by one court, is
that "the act never became a law, and as such has no existence. The
attempt of the legislature, to breathe life into this inanimate object by
amending the title ... was ineffective." 86 Another court said, "It is an
alarming proposition that a legislature can pass an Act, void, because
the subject of it is not expressed in the title, and then, after it has gone
among the statutes of the Commonwealth, a subsequent legislature
imposes its burdens upon the public by simply manufacturing for the
void Act a good title."87 Obviously, these statements are based upon the
idea that the unconstitutional act is and was always a lifeless thing. If
we concede the correctness of the premise, the conclusion seems inevitable that the enactment of a good title will not revive the body of the
statute whose invalidity is due to the lack of a constitutionally sufficient
title. It might be suggested, however, that if the act were not considered void and of no more force or validity "than a piece of blank paper,"
as declared by some courts, the removal of this barrier to its effectiveness should instantaneously give it full operative effect as a valid law8 8
in the same manner as the removal of other constitutional barriers has
been held sometimes to do.
As already stated, many constitutions today prescribe that no law
shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to title alone, but that
the statute subjected to revisory legislation shall be re-enacted at length.
A provision laying down this mandate would seem sufficient in itself to
v. Palmer, 93 Va. 159, 24 S.E. 930 (1896).
State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 59 P. 340 (1889); State v. Burgdoefer, 107 Mo. 1,
17 S.W. 646 (1891); Baker v. Dept. of Registration, 78 Utah 424, 3 P. (2d) 1082 (1931).
84 People v. DeBlaay, 137 Mich. 402, 100 N.W. 598 (1904); Ex parte Hutchens, 296
Mo. 331, 246 S.W. 186 (1922); State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715,
59 s.w. 1033 (1900).
85 McLaughlin v. Summitt Hill Borough, 224 Pa. 425 at 428, 73 A. 975 (1909).
86 Bennett v. Sullivan County, 29 Pa. Super. 120 at 124 (1905).
87 Shear v. Potter County, 9 Pa. Dist. Rep. 289 at 291 (1899).
88 See, for example, Allison v. Corker, 67 N.J.L 596, 52 A. 362 (1902).
82Lacey

83
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make ineffective any legislative effort to remove the barrier causing constitutional conflict by simply supplying a new title. Nevertheless, a few
cases indicate, even where a statute is framed so as to be wholly or in part
unconstitutional but having a title expressing a constitutional object,
that it may by amendatory legislation be rendered constitutional without
having recourse to an amendment independent throughout its provisions. This result has been reached in face of the constitutional requirement that "no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its
title only but the act revived or the section or sections amended, shall
be inserted at length." The requirement was considered by the court
to be inapplicable and the contention rejected that, where a statute is
wholly unconstitutional, an amendment of the part which makes it so
leaves the rest unaffected unless also inserted at length in the new
statute. 89

The Curative Statute
The discussion thus far has been concerned chiefly with the removal of the constitutional defect or barrier by an amendment rather
than by the enactment of a simple curative statute and no technical
distinction has been made between curative acts and amendatory acts.
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that a curative act is not the
same as an amendatory act, although' they may be nearly synonymous
so far as effect is concerned and each sometimes may be utilized to accomplish the same end.90 Moreover, as is apparent upon examination,
the scope of the amendatory act is more comprehensive. It may be defined as a statute which makes an addition to or operates to change the
original so as to bring about an improvement therein or to carry out
more effectively the purpose for which the original statute was enacted.
The curative statute, on the other hand and so far as we are now concerned, is one which simply seeks by the enactment of a ratifying law,91
to confirm and ratify and make legal, acts performed under an unconstitutional act. It has no prospective effect and will not validate future
action based on the original enactment.92
89 Allison v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 A. 362 (1902). Also see Morris v. State, 40
Ariz. 32, 9 P. (2d) 404 (1932); Clay v. Buchanan, 162 Tenn. 204, 36 S.W. (2d) 91

(1931).
.
oo See O'Pry v. United States, 249 U.S. 323, 39 S.Ct. 305. (1919) for distinction
between "amendment" and "addition," and Kelly v. Laing, 259 Mich. 212, 242 N.W. 891
(1932) for definition of amendment.
91 For a curative statute, see Horton v. Kyle, 81 Fla. 274, 88 S. 757 (1921).
92People ex rel. Patterson v. Woodruff, 280 ill. 472, ll'Z N.E. 791 (1917); Sindow
v. Montana Home for the Aged, 88 Mont. 337, 292 P. 722 (1930); Conde v. Schenectady,
.164 N.Y. 258, 58 N.E. 130 (1900); Petition of Miller, 149 Pa. Super. 142, 28 A. (2d)
257 (1942); Hunt County v. Rains County, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 7 S.W. (2d) 648.
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It has been held that an unconstitutional statute cannot be made
constitutional by a curative act.93 There are also cases which, while perhaps not going that far, rather consistently suggest that the law-makers
may not, by a subsequent curative act, validate a prior unconstitutional
law, at least, not to the extent that vested rights will be disturbed. 94
Other cases merely carry the inference that it is not within the power
of the legislature to validate such a statute by curative legislation95 and
they suggest that perhaps the true limit of the curative power of the
legislature as gathered from all the authorities is, or ought to be, that it
can reach things voidable only, not void; defects of execution only, not
of authority or jurisdiction; and it is confined to defective proceedings
under previous legislative authority.96 This would indicate that ?Cts
done under an unconstitutional statute might be validated if the legislature originally had the authority to confer the power to perform such
acts,97 but not otherwise,98 and that the role of a true curative statute
is not to constitutionalize an invalid law.

Codification and R~ision

An analysis of the cases reveals that, under some circumstances, a
statute invalid because not passed in accordance with constitutional requirements may become valid upon its inclusion in a duly adopted or
enacted code or revision. This has been the result where the statute
as originally enacted violated the constitutional provision against the
passage of an amending or repealing act by reference to title only.99 Un98 Genzer v. Fillip, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 134 S.W. (2d) 730. See, however, Pelo
v. Stevens, 66 Misc. 35, 120 N.Y.S. 227 (1909).
94 Preveslin v. Derby & A. Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 518 (1930);
Helming v. Forrester, 87 Neb. 438, 127 N.W. 373 (1910); Lennox v. Housing Authority
of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940).
95People ex rel. Patterson v. Woodruff, 280 Ill. 472, 117 N.E. 791 (1917); Lewis
County v. Gordon, 20 Wash. 80, 54 P. 779 (1898).
96 People ex rel. Rhodes v. Miller, 392 Ill. 445, 64 N.E. (2d) 869 (1946); Whitlock
v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242, 53 S.E. 401 (1906); Kimball v. Town of Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407
(1877). Also see Western New York & P. Ry. Co. v. Buffalo, 176 Misc. 350 at 354, 27
N.Y.S. (2d) 249 (1941): " ••• [these curative] acts, however, can only cure defects in
procedure as to steps which the Legislature could have dispensed with in the fust instance•••• They cannot supply jurisdictional defects."
97 Davidge v. Binghampton, 62 App. Div. 525, 71 N.Y.S. 282 (1901);
98 People v. Wisconsin Central R. Co., 219 Ill. 94, 76 N.E. 80 (1905); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Barnes, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 280 S.W. 275; Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va.
242, 53 S.E. 401 (1906).
99 McFarland v. Donaldson, 115 Ga. 567, 41 S.E. 1000 (1902). Also see Banks v.
Peek, 249 Ala. 32 at 35, 29 S. (2d) 418 (1947): "Infirmities occurring in legislature
procedure, if any, in the passage of said acts revised and brought forward into the Code of
1940 and adopted as a part thereof were cured by the act adopting the code, and such
statutes as revised or rewritten speak in the language of the revision, regardless of the
provisions of the original acts." Note also Herndon v. State, 16 Okla. Cr. 586, 185 P. 701
(1919).
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der these circumstances, the court held that the inclusion of the invalid
act in the subsequently adopted codification cured the constitutional
defect. The same result has also been said to take place where the unconstitutionality of the statute which was later included in a codification was due to a title which was defective in that it referred to more
than one subject or contained matter different from that indicated by
the language of the title. 100 The adoption of the codification, it was
said, operated to constitutionalize the prior unconstitutional statute.
On the other hand, however, where the statute as originally enacted
was invalid for lack of constitutional authorization for its enactment, inasmuch as the statute, as originally enacted, did not fall within the scope
of the subjects designated by the governor in his call for the special legislative session at which it was passed, its inclusion in a subsequent code
or revision did not give it constitutional validity. 101 As is obvious, the
enactment of the code did not remove the barrier to the subsequent
effective enactment of the statute in question.
It is apparent, therefore, that if the adoption of a revision or codi6.catiori is to constitutionalize an unconstitutional statute, several things
must exist. Certainly, the constitutional defect must not be one which
is inherent in the subject matter of the included statute but one due
merely to the manner of its original enactment,1°2 and the codification or
revision must also result in the complete re-enactment of the prior unconstitutional act,103 unless perhaps the act of codification or revision,
instead of actually containing the statutes which are to make up the
code or revision, simply adopts and enacts them by reference, as is
sometimes the case.104 In this latter event, the problems of amending
statutes generally by reference again present themselves and such
amendment can be considered either as sufficient or insufficient to
make the unconstitutional statute constitutional depending upon the
view adopted as controlling amendments of this type.105 If, however,
codification by reference is not resorted to, it would seem that the
adoption of a code or revision should operate as a re-enactment of all
existing statutes included, except where the adoption act expressed
100 McConville v. Ft. Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 101 Fla. 727, 135 S. 392 (1931);
Central of Georgia Ry. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531 (1898); Emmett Irrigation
Dist. v. McNish, 38 Idaho 241, 220 P. 409 (1932); Quick v. City of Fairview, 144 Okla.
231, 291 P. 95 (1930); Brady v. Cooper, 46 S.D. 419, 193 N.W. 246 (1923); Ex parte
Bentine, 181 Wis. 579, 196 N.W. 213 (1923).
101 Bowen v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 118 Mo. 541, 24 S.W. 436 (1893).
102 See Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923).
10s See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 52 S.Ct. 397 (1932).
10,1 Mathis v. State, 31 Fla. 291, 12 S. 681 (1893); State ex rel. Griffith v. Davis,
Governor, 116 Kan. 663, 225 P. 1064 (1924).
105 See text to notes 69-74 supra.
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a different legislative intent.106 Unfortunately the cases do not necessarily support such a conclusion. For instance, the rule is often laid down
that a revision which includes an existing statute continues the law
common to both from the date of the statute's first enactment1°7-a view
in accord with that usually held by the courts relative to the effect of simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of statutes generally. And it is,
naturally, subject to the same criticism.108
Even where the view prevails that the inclusion of an unconstitutional statute in a code or revision will make it constitutional, the
inclusion of the statute in a mere compilation,1° 9 or in an unofficial
revision or codification,110 of course, will have no effect upon the included statute. And even an official revision would in no way affect an
included statute if the revision is not regarded as "the law itself" but simply. as evidence of the law1 11 -all of which further emphasizes the
importance of knowing the real nature of the legislative act of revision.
Conclusion

Two conclusions appear inevitable so far as unconstitutional statutes
are concerned, if the legislature desires to keep effective control of the
legislative field. First, to make certain that a statute previously declared
unconstitutional will not become effective after the removal of the
barrier to its effectiveness as a law either by the adoption of an amendment to the constitution or by the overruling of the decision by which
its unconstitutionality was adjudged, the statute should be expressly repealed by the legislature and thereby stricken from the statute books in
order to eliminate the danger that it might become effective without
legislative action. Second, to amend effectively an unconstitutional
statute so as to bring a constitutional law into being, either where the
lack of constitutional authority for its enactment has been supplied
100 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 52
101 Wade v. Farrell, 270 Mich. 562,

S.Ct. 397 (1931).
259 N.W. 326 (1935); State v. Reynolds, 59
S.D. 53, 238 N.W. 142 (1931). But note Banks v. Peek, 249 Ala. 32, 29 S. (2d) 418
(1947).
10s See text to notes 80-81 supra.
109 Wood v. State, 98 Fla. 703, 123 S. 540 (1929).
110 City of Baltimore v. Williams, 124 Md. 502, 92 A. 1066 (1915).
111 State ex rel. Griffith v. Davis, 116 Kan. 663 at 667, 229 P. 757 (1924): " ••• the
Revised statutes of 1923 became, on publication, not merely evidence of the law, but the
law itself." Note also Lomax v. Lomax, 176 Ga. 605, 168 S.E. 863 (1933); American
Indemnity Co. v. City of Austin, 112 Tex. 239, 246 S.W. 1019 (1922). But see Langston v. Canterbury, 173 Mo. 122 at 129, 73 S.W. 151 at 152 (1903): "Those volumes are
as authoritative as the volumes containing the session acts, and whilst it is possible for error
or mistake to creep into one as well as the other, yet the verity of either can not be questioned except in the face of the original documents on file in the office of the Secretary of
State."
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by constitutional amendment or where the unconstitutionality has been
due to a failure on the part of the legislature p;roperly to exercise existing constitutional power, the old statute should be repealed, preferably
by an independent repealing act, and the former law re-enacted as a
new statute with the changes incorporated that are required for conformity with the constitution.
If the requirements of this second conclusion were followed by the
law-makers in their efforts to remove constitutional defects by the adoption of corrective amendments, most of the difficult problems now arising out of this use of the amending process would be avoided. It is, in
most instances, a simple matter to repeal the unconstitutional statute in
one act and to re-enact the old statute as amended in another. The assurance that the amended statute will be fully effective justifies any
additional legislative effort that may be necessitated.
Of course, where long and complicated acts or codes are involved,
complete repeal and re-enactment as amended by resort to two separate
bills may not be altogether practical. In lieu of the procedure just recommended, where only a section or two are unconstitutional, the repeal of
the unconstitutional sections by one bill and· the enactment of the new
sections by another should in most instances, at least, achieve effective
amendment. Ample support for this conclusion may be found in those
cases which hold ·that if there is something alive on which the lawmakers may engraft an amendment-in this instance the constitutional
sections of the act or code--amendment is possible _without complete
re-enactment. Yet, even here, it must be borne in mind that if the rest
of the act or code is dependent upon the part declared unconstitutional
so that the legislative intent appears to be that the act is an inseparable
whole, the entire act should be repealed and a new one .enacted in
accord with the recommendation set forth above with reference to unconstitutional statutes generally.
The foregoing conclusions may be the· product of over-caution but
nevertheless, in face of the importance of statute law, are justified, and
especially so where the highest court of the state has not placed itself
clearly on record concerning the need for complete re-enactment of the
unconstitutional statute. It is sub~itted that the perils arising from
the uncertainty of the statute's effectiveness where it is not <:ompletely
re-enacted in the attempt to make the prior statute unconstitutional,
warrants the use of that method of enactment which will best insure that
the statute as· amended will take effect in accord with the intent of the
legisl~ture. The uncertainty of a statute's meaning is bad enough, but
the uncertainty of its effectiveness is far worse.

